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Abstract 
Scotland's urgent constitutional question, which will be addressed in a referendum in the autumn of 
2014, challenges many conventional assumptions about what is at stake in the struggle over 
sovereign authority and political identity, and about how that struggle might be treated and 
resolved. This essay investigates that challenge 
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Scotland's Constitutional Future: Interdependent independence or independent 
interdependence? 
 
Neil Walker 
 
 Scotland's urgent constitutional question challenges many conventional  assumptions about what is 
at stake in  the struggle over sovereign authority and political identity, and about how that struggle  
might be treated or resolved. My essay investigates that challenge.  
 
1.  A New Geopolitical Landscape 
 
 
In his fascinating study of the global impact of the American Declaration of Independence 
(Armitage, 2007), David Armitage alerts us to the distinctive political grammar of the modern 
world.  He demonstrates how the famous 1776 Declaration was more than the collective self-
assertion of one fledgling community – or community of communities -  seeking to free itself from 
the colonial yoke.  It was, in addition, the keystone of a new kind of global architecture. The 
Declaration was, of course, primarily addressed to the nascent American people, but it also sought 
and found a planetary audience. Its message reflected and reinforced the notion that national 
sovereignty – the governing idea of the emerging state system – possessed a double aspect. 
Sovereignty referred, in its internal orientation, to the idea that independent statehood should be 
consecrated in an act or process of popular self-authorization. It involved an exercise of constituent 
power by which ‘the people’, typically through a constitutional scheme, mandated a comprehensive 
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framework  of self-rule. But sovereignty also referred, in its external orientation, to the necessity, if 
independent statehood was  to mean what it said, that it be recognised  by all other powers. These 
other powers would be required both to acknowledge the distinct title of the American people to 
participate in international relations as a newly independent state and to commit themselves to non-
interference in the internal affairs of that new state. 
Yet the Declaration acquired  a  broader global resonance. The Americans not only sought 
recognition for themselves. They also offered a model for general use. In proclaiming their ‘separate 
and equal Station’ as one of the ‘Free and Independent States among ‘the Powers of the Earth’, the 
Declaration's framers encouraged many other aspiring states over the following two centuries  to 
adopt the same template. Popular self-determination was presented as a universally valid claim, and 
sovereign statehood treated as a ‘Station’ available to all nations. And crucially, the very quality of 
sovereignty as a title to authority that was both  (internally) comprehensive and (externally) 
exclusive,  meant that there need be no contradiction, at least in principle, between the full 
satisfaction of the particular claim and the notion that all were similarly entitled.    
Of course, principle is far from everything in international politics. The idea of a  global 
order of mutually exclusive and mutually respecting state sovereignties was only ever partially 
honoured. The modern world has seen many waves of imperialism, and much resistance to claims 
of self-determination by subaltern communities and other nationalist movements. Indeed, 
sovereignty has often been invoked to frustrate rather than  promote equal standing between 
political communities. It has been used cynically by established states either to justify  their  non-
recognition  or suppression of other national movements or to resist interference by those who 
might protest against their internal or external abuses of power.  Yet even as a heavily qualified 
good, and one disproportionately enjoyed by Western powers,  the 1776 Declaration envisaged and  
inspired a system of global authority that was coherent in its own terms. It supplied a language and 
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logic of justification that was not merely conservative of existing authority, but could  also be  used 
by many embryonic polities in pursuit of  constitutional self-determination.  
If the ‘high modern’ world ushered in by the 1776 Declaration emphasised universality of 
form, comprehensiveness of authority, and mutual exclusivity of claims, the ‘late modern’ world in 
which contemporary claims to independence are articulated in Scotland and elsewhere  looks quite 
different. While the state  remains the  focus of political organisation, it is now merely first amongst 
equals. In place of a universal and uniform template of sovereign statehood we have a highly 
differentiated global mosaic of  legal and political capacities. In place of internal sovereignty as 
comprehensive and monopolistic, authority is typically partial – distributed between various  
political sites and levels, states and otherwise. And in place of mutual exclusivity as the default 
condition of external sovereignty, we have overlap, interlock  and mutual interference. 
Why and how so? No single ‘x’ factor explains the ongoing movement from universality, 
comprehensiveness and mutual exclusivity to differentiation, partiality and overlap. Rather, there is 
a combination and accumulation of forces. Some tendencies challenge  states and their borders as 
effective containers of power. The long post-war development of transnational markets, 
communication media and cultural forms, has gradually eroded the material capacity  of the nation 
state as the axis of economic power and political authority, and, to a lesser extent, its symbolic 
locus as the core of political identity. Institutional responses to these changes have underscored the 
state-decentring trend. Globally inclusive entities  such as the United Nations and exclusive 
groupings  such as the G8,  as well as regional institutions like the EU, have both tracked and 
reinforced the development of forms of collective action and public goods (and 'bads') beyond the 
state. Their remit ranges far and wide, from the provision of security to the protection of human 
rights, and from the making of transnational markets to  market  ‘correction’  in spheres as diverse 
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as food safety, environmental protection, energy efficiency and criminal justice co-operation. 
Overlapping  these umbrella institutions there is a dense network of powerful, functionally 
specialist transnational organisations, from state-controlled public bodies such as the World Trade 
Organisation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, through  hybrid public/private entities 
such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, to purely non-state organs such 
as the International Olympic Committee.   
Alongside these global and transnational tendencies, other disturbances  to the authority of 
the state emanate from below. Ironically, the seeds of this challenge to the modem system were 
sown  in the foundational American settlement. As  well as the first modern state, the United States 
was also the first mature federation. It gave novel constitutional form to the idea of territorially 
distributed  power within the polity. However, it did so in a way which -  even if it required a  Civil 
War to settle the matter definitively   - understood the  allocation of jurisdiction between federal 
government and provincial or 'state' institutions as an expression of the  sovereign authority of the 
United States as an integrated  whole rather than as an  internal challenge to its integrity.  
Federalism, US-style, was designed and rolled out in a particular way, involving a clear 
division between the two levels of authority and their respective policy spheres, a high degree of 
ethnic or cultural homogeneity between the different state units, and uniform and symmetrical legal 
and institutional  treatment of these units. Contemporary federalism, or quasi-federalism, has 
gradually departed  from that classical norm. Most newer federations, such as Germany,  are  'co-
operative' rather than 'dual' arrangements, involving a significant degree of policy overlap and 
institutional  interlocking  between central and local levels. Many, such as Canada, Spain or 
Belgium, are also multinational or multiethnic rather than merely territorial compacts, with some 
constituencies retaining aspirations towards stronger forms of constitutional recognition. And these 
multinational or multiethnic federations tend, in addition,  towards uneven or asymmetrical 
treatment of their provinces; those with the clearest or most longstanding traditions of 
distinctiveness, or the strongest claim to national identity, are accorded more ample recognition of  
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cultural goods such as language or religion, greater regional governmental autonomy, or 
disproportionate influence at the federal centre. All  these factors combine to create a looser and 
more fluid political form, challenging the earlier conception of  the federal state as a mere variation 
of the 'sovereigntist' ideal of a well ordered and permanently settled unity. 
So when considering the overall challenge to the universality, comprehensiveness and 
mutual exclusivity of the modern state system  we must look to both flanks -  to pressures from the 
substate interior as well as from the transnational beyond. Furthermore, the two dynamics feed off 
one another. Claims to substate national recognition or protection are powerfully sponsored through 
global mechanisms for the promotion of individual or collective rights,  while supranational  
institutions such as the EU  provide a  scale of policy and economic support which makes the 
ambition of greater regional autonomy within existing states more viable. By the same token, just 
because existing states have gradually ceded authority and capacity upwards to other territorial or 
functional institutions, they may become less attractive magnets for substate nations and less well 
equipped to maintain their sovereign integrity. 
 
2. The Spectrum of Scottish self-government  
 
How does this shifting  geopolitical landscape  illuminate the stakes and prospects in  the Scottish 
independence debate?  I begin  with a series of  outline  propositions. 
         Under  the 2012 Edinburgh  Agreement, with its commitment to a single referendum question 
in 2014, the Scottish debate  has now been firmly constitutionally coded  in the familiar binary 
terms of high modernity -  a straight choice between staying put in one sovereign state or going it 
alone in a new one. Yet, as the caution and delicacy with which both sides have sought  to position 
themselves in the debate  only serves to make clear - not least, ironically, on account of their shared 
tendency  to deflect scrutiny of their own stance by exposing the fragilities and uncertainties  of the 
other side  -  the underlying situation is  more complex. Our  islands are far from immune from the 
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forces sketched above.  In fact, the  factors reshaping the geopolitical landscape towards a more 
varied  range of polities exhibiting more restricted and more heavily overlapping forms of authority 
and capacity  apply with particular force in our local context. The claims of comprehensiveness and 
autonomy associated with internal and external  sovereignty are available neither to those who 
would argue for the retention of  Scotland within the British state nor to advocates of  Scottish 
independence.  In the words of my title, any  solution that  retains Scotland as  part of an 
'interdependent' United Kingdom is still likely to be a relatively 'independent' solution - one 
permitting  Scotland a significant degree of self-government and distinctive voice. Conversely,  any 
solution that recognises Scotland's 'independent' statehood is nevertheless apt to retain a  high level 
of  'interdependence' with the rest of the UK, the EU and  the broader network of global institutions. 
Rather than categorical opposites, therefore, we  are  faced with a  graduated range  of possibilities  
clustered along a narrower spectrum.  
      This invites a number of conclusions. To begin with, it explains why, for all the early reluctance 
of  the protagonists to commit themselves, the Scottish constitutional debate cannot avoid intricate 
questions of institutional architecture and policy content. What independence, or its absence, 
entails, and where its threshold lies, requires respecification,  and   detailed argument will be 
important in making the popular and political case for or against independence.  
          If the premium on institutional design and policy content is unsurprising and has been widely 
anticipated, two further implications of  the spectral character of the constitutional debate are less 
well appreciated.  In the first place, for all  that the debate is geared towards constitutional 
settlement, the absence of bright-line solutions together with the broader unpredictability of  
constitutional politics  in a multi-level, interlocking context means that we are likely to remain in a 
state of  constitutional unsettlement for the foreseeable future. In the second place, as one special 
feature of unpredictability and uncertainty, the tendency towards  less  sovereigntist solutions is 
bound to alter the symbolic politics of  constitutional identity in ways  we  cannot yet fully imagine.  
We are entering a phase where the psychology of political belonging and self-identification must 
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confront a long-term  shift in the availability, distribution and combination of the  practical means 
of individual and collective self-determination.  
         Let me  now  develop  these points  more fully. 
(a) the changing environment of the Scottish debate  
Why is the Scottish constitutional debate particularly susceptible to the various trends discussed 
above? Partly this has to do with the global situation of the United Kingdom, partly with the 
European context, and partly with the specific historical position  of Scotland relative to the rest of  
the UK. 
         In global terms, the post-imperial UK, though widely understood to be in long-term decline,  
retains a relatively strong  economic, cultural  and diplomatic presence. In a world of increasing 
variety and interconnectedness of political forms and of ever denser transnational regulation, 
however, such strength does not manifest itself as independence from global networks. External 
sovereignty today  involves more, not less,  involvement with other  authority systems, and the 
restrictions  as well as the opportunities associated with such involvement. Britain's permanent seat 
in  the UN Security Council, for example, or  membership of the G8, or  recognition as one of five 
'nuclear weapon states' under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, both reflect and underscore its 
international standing and influence, as well as the constraints  associated with collective 
engagement. 
         In regional terms, the  European continent is one where classical understandings of 
sovereignty - internal and external - have become more generally transformed over the last half 
century. Like all member states of the supranational EU  - originally Six but  rising to Nine with 
British accession in 1973 and now to 28 in 2013 - the UK has conceded to the demands  of the 
common European market all  domestic control and external Treaty authority over the  circulation 
of the  factors of production -  persons, goods, services and capital -  and over much of the broader 
regulation of commerce. Increasingly, the EU institutions - Council, Commission, Parliament and 
Court of Justice - have also acquired jurisdiction in other, more or (increasingly) less market-related 
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areas as wide-ranging as the environment, public health, energy and internal and external security. 
In a context of  gradual integration, reinforced by a common regime of human rights protection in 
the wider framework  of the Council of Europe, all members of the EU - even  one as notoriously 
semi-detached as the UK - are experiencing the  synergies and compromises, the accommodations 
and conflicts  of multi-level governance more than any other  region at any point in modern history.  
          As regards the internal UK context, our comparative reference point is the versatile model   of  
federal  authority. Yet so evolved rather than designed,  so uneven rather than symmetrical, and so 
fluid rather than fixed has been the development of   devolved power to Scotland and the other 
nations of the UK, that it would be a stretch too far to describe the  resulting pattern in federal terms 
at all.  Some prefer  the older  language of 1707 in characterising the UK as a "Union state" ( 
Rokkan and Urwin,  1982) - comprising once distinct and still distinguishable nations, and required 
for its survival to continue  nurturing some of these diverse institutional and cultural roots and the 
aspirations associated with them. The accommodation of diversity in the deep political culture  is 
reinforced by the absence of the kind of settled constitutional blueprint we associate with the 
nominate federal tradition. Instead of a rigid frame in which both  floor and ceiling of devolved 
authority are set in stone,  we have a long, twisting, gradually accelerating and still open-ended 
narrative. This has  embraced  post-Union retention and selective cultivation of a distinctive Scots 
law and home-grown educational and religious institutions, a longstanding and gradually extended 
commitment to administrative devolution, the eventual establishment of a Scottish Parliament in  
1999, and now, the introduction of  a successor Scotland Act  2012 which foresees  significantly 
extended fiscal powers to complement legislative and executive autonomy. 
        These factors combine to suggest that the choice between remaining in the UK and becoming 
an independent state cannot be well understood in classically binary  sovereigntist terms. Even from 
a  perspective of purely Scottish self-interest,  the question of advantage becomes one of fine and 
shifting balance; between, on the one hand, remaining absorbed within the authority of a larger  
state, and all  that  implies in terms of a sacrifice of some decisional autonomy for sustained 
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influence and capacity as part of the larger unit, and, on the other hand, full sovereign 
independence, and all that  implies in terms of  a sacrifice of some forms of influence and capacity 
for greater decisional autonomy in pursuit of national interests and aspirations. 
       The complexities of the new constitutional options, and the weighing and balancing involved, 
are profound indeed.  As  the global and European picture makes clear, in the presence of an 
increasingly powerful and  intrusive   transnational regulatory domain the purchase of influence and 
capacity at the price of autonomy is not just the lot of the substate nation. It is  a price  any 
traditionally sovereign state, the UK included, increasingly must pay in the late modern age - 
especially if it sits at or near the top table -  just as it is a price any nascent  state inevitably pays as 
it seeks to  join the international community.  And compounding the complexity, in our particularly   
fluid local environment, the underlying conceptual distinction  between interdependence and 
independence  appears ever fuzzier at the margins.  Devolution in the Union state can be stretched 
to include significant autonomy from the central political system, just as independence, as we shall 
see, can be qualified to allow a wide range of continuing interdependencies with the rest of the UK 
and beyond. 
(b) redefining independence 
Ever since the publication  by Scotland's  first SNP  government in 2007 of  Choosing Scotland's 
Future -   announcing a "national conversation" on Scotland's constitutional outlook and setting the 
tone for the party's  subsequent strategy - the nationalist movement has sought to define 
independence in a manner which takes considerable distance from the sovereigntist certainties of 
high political modernity. Externally, membership of the EU is fully embraced, and this 
automatically implies continued common UK regulation in many areas. Participation is also sought 
in key global organisations such as the Commonwealth, the World Health Organisation, the 
Organisation of  Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Trade Organisation, and - in 
a recent change of  policy -  the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. More tellingly, even within the 
ambit of the  British Isles the nationalist approach emphasises continuity with certain lateral 
Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2013/05 
 
 
constitutional initiatives of recent years. Both the Joint Ministerial Committee framework, which 
provides  for the various governments of the United Kingdom to work together,  and the British-
Irish Council, established in 1998 under the auspices of the Good Friday Agreement  for co-
operative amongst  all the executives of the two states, are endorsed  as vital confederal supports for 
a newly independent Scotland rather banished as relics of an outmoded settlement.   Accordingly, 
while formal international sovereignty - the idea of a separate voice and seat in global affairs - is 
insisted upon as one non-negotiable fundamental of independence, much of that sovereignty is then 
to be re-pooled or re-mixed in the name of collective action or co-ordinated policy. 
          Even  more  striking is the willingness to countenance  continuing UK influence over  certain 
traditional areas of internal sovereignty. The 2007 prospectus launched the idea of a "social Union", 
and subsequent debate has suggested   this may extend to  a common British platform of social 
welfare. Defence and the retention of a  sterling currency Union - the latter revived in light of the 
diminishing attractiveness of the Euro -  are two other high profile areas where the longstanding, 
complex intertwining of policy has provoked consideration of the continued pooling of resources 
and competences. In other areas, too,  such as the media and immigration, the manifest and 
manifold cross-border and broader transnational policy 'externalities', recognised and reinforced by  
the tightening grip of  common EU regulation,  argue in favour of the retention of a common policy 
front. 
        From the Unionist side, conversely, we  observe a  willingness to push out the devolutionary 
boat  -  to  'define down' what is required by way of policy, institutional or fiscal  commonality  to 
retain the integrity of the United Kingdom. The Calman Commission, which reported  to broad 
Unionist agreement in 2009, and which provided much of the impetus behind the 2012 Scotland 
Act, is one example. And while the different Unionist parties have been unwilling, either in their 
'non-discussion' of a possible third referendum option or as a more general forward-looking 
initiative, to put their support  behind a common conception of 'devo-max',  each Party is committed 
to bring forward its own proposals for further constitutional reform. 
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             And so the constitutional debate, deprived of sharp sovereigntist definition,  moves towards 
a crowded middle. This opens up two key areas of contestation. One concerns the attractiveness and 
plausibility of the different alternatives. If  the nationalists cannot simply point to the purity of the 
Promised Land, then, as already noted, they must make the case for a deliverable package  that 
strikes an optimal balance between decisional autonomy and retention of capacity and influence. 
Likewise, if the Unionists concede that the status quo is not ideal, they must argue for a similarly 
optimal and deliverable solution from their end of the constitutional spectrum.  A  related  
controversy - one that will grow in significance as the referendum approaches and questions of 
definition come to the fore - concerns the authenticity of the self-positioning on the spectrum of the 
sponsors of each approach.  Is the case for a heavily  qualified form of independence still 
nevertheless a case for independence, or  is it a case of false pretences? Equally,  is the pitch for a 
heavily qualified form of Unionism still nevertheless a pitch for the UK, or is it simply a fig-leaf - a 
refusal to acknowledge a process of inexorable drift and dissolution? In a world of eroded and 
interlocking sovereignties there is is no objective 'fact of the matter', no neutral test to determine 
whether or not this or that position is 'really' one of independence or  'truly' and stably  Unionist. 
There are only the more or less persuasive arguments of either side that their position is both 
attractive and plausible in its own terms and  can make genuine claim to the inheritance of the ideal 
of independence on the one hand or the legacy of the Union on the other.  
(c) towards constitutional unsettlement  
It is true but trite to say that we live in unsettled constitutional times. The referendum debate will 
stretch over two years, and regardless of how the vote goes, there will be various consequential 
moves, either to further reform and consolidate the Union or to  enter and conclude formal 
negotiations for the severance of the Union and develop an indigenous Scottish Constitution. These 
will throw up many additional matters of dispute and will take years to resolve. Beyond the 
obvious, however, there are other factors which suggest unsettlement is not simply a passing 
incident of a  significant constitutional moment, but a deeper condition of  our new geopolitical age. 
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         In part, this is due to the disappearance of categorical  constitutional answers in the changing 
climate. Faced no longer with a binary choice but with a continuum of constitutional options, it is 
less likely that the Scottish and British people will treat any particular resting point on that 
continuum  as decisive. Politicians may talk as if we are in the constitutional end game. They may 
even hope or believe it to be so. But the lack of clear red lines in the debate and the continuing 
availability of incremental adjustments, together with the fact that solutions at the indistinct margins 
between independence and interdependence can be interpreted differently  on either side, means 
that  both the opportunity  and the political energy and motivation    for constitutional re-
engagement are likely to persist. 
         In part, however, unsettlement is also a matter of complex interdependence, and the multi-
actor and multi-level quality of new constitutional  processes and  sequences. Where  bright-line 
solutions are unavailable  and constitutional arguments are likely to turn on the relative 
attractiveness and plausibility of  differing calculations of the balance between autonomy, capacity 
and influence,  the ability to develop a compelling narrative of  constitutional sustainability or 
progress is at a premium.  Yet, when all constitutional projects become vulnerable to forces and 
agent  beyond  the control of their authors, precisely this kind of narrative confidence can prove 
elusive. 
         The EU  is an obvious case to illustrate my point. The last months of 2013 witnessed 
controversy over how and on what terms an independent Scotland might retain or resume its 
membership of the supranational club. Yet the debate proved inconclusive. Even after the 
intervention of the European Commission, it remained uncertain whether an independent Scotland 
should have continuing membership alongside the rest of the UK, or whether Scotland would have 
to re-apply like any new candidate, either because it would be deemed to have seceded from the 
larger UK entity or, more radically, because the UK itself would be treated as dissolved - in which 
case each  successor state would have to rejoin.  This lack of clarity stems from the fact that, as with 
so many constitutional conundrums of a post-sovereigntist age, we are entering virgin territory. 
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There is no precedent for the devolved part of an existing EU state becoming independent, and  no 
definitive answer to be drawn from historical practice. What is absolutely clear, however, is that 
Scottish independence would require substantial renegotiation of the terms of EU membership.  
Questions of representation in European institutions, of budgetary contribution, of participation in 
the programme of  justice and home affairs, and, of course, of membership of the Euro, would have 
to be addressed anew, as would many other important issues. Whether  done in the context of the 
accession negotiations of a new state, or through the amendment of longstanding Treaty agreements 
amongst existing states, tough choices would have to be made and difficult compromises struck. 
Certainly, there would be no unilateral right for Scotland to dictate terms, regardless of whether 
their international law position was treated as one of new or of continuing membership. Whichever 
route was taken,  the terms of Scotland's membership would depend on what all  existing members 
could be persuaded to accept - including members such as Spain concerned about secessionist 
movements in their own sovereign backyard.   
         Yet if this speaks to a near future of profound uncertainty, matters look not dissimilar from the 
other side of the debate. In a context of rising Euroscepticism  in and beyond the Conservative 
Party, the prospect looms of a referendum in the next Parliament, whether on retention of core  
status or,  as seems ever more likely, on the very principle of continuing UK membership of the EU. 
The outcome of such a referendum is difficult to call. If a favourable vote depends upon  a looser 
compact, there is no guarantee that the EU will be receptive to negotiation,  and even if the UK 
renews its European vows the vicissitudes of the Euro over the last three years remind us that  
European membership, even on favourable terms, is hardly today a condition of copper-bottomed 
stability.  
         What is true of the EU is also true of other  exclusive international organisations such as the 
Security Council, or the G8, or the Nuclear Club. Given the  volatility of many such international 
regimes, the constitutional projection is one of uncertainty on both sides of the question. The  
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stubborn prospect of multi-faceted constitutional unsettlement, therefore, is one that afflicts all  
positions, and which is emerging as one of the defining conditions of the debate  
(d) Reframing political identity  
Sovereign statehood, typically endorsed in a foundational constitutional text, has traditionally 
supplied not only  a vehicle  of authority but also a focus of political identity. It expresses and 
affirms the   self-determining status  of a community of affinity. But what becomes of the identity 
dimension of constitutional statehood when its accompanying authority, as a matter of both fact and 
prospect, becomes divided, qualified, pooled or is otherwise rendered precarious in the ways 
discussed above? If state sovereignty is not what it used to be, what does that imply for the 
aspirations of political belonging and self-realisation of those who either do or do not  identify with 
that state? Translated into local terms,  if political authority in these islands is now split and shared  
between and beyond  their  various seats of government, and will continue to be regardless of 
whether  the Scottish pathway stops at 'independent interdependence'  or proceeds towards 
'interdependent independence ', does this alter how constitutional  self-government  is  likely to be 
perceived and pursued as a  badge of political identity?  
       Two contrasting possibilities suggest themselves. One would envisage the expressive 
dimension of nationalism declining in importance, while  the other would see its importance 
elevated. From  one viewpoint, identity should  track and shadow actual political  capacity and 
influence. In that perspective,  the diffuse quality  of political authority is likely to be reflected in 
the multi-layering of political identity and belonging. - a tendency encouraged by the fact that a 
majority of Scots  already embrace dual British and Scottish identities. Scottish independence, from 
such an angle, would become ever less a vindication of a categorical sense of  political identity. It 
would be  pursued, if at all, primarily on the basis of an instrumental calculus -  as a platform for   
better achieving the optimal mix of  autonomy, capacity and influence on behalf of a preferred (but, 
for many, not exclusive) community  of attachment  than would be available from a UK point of 
departure. 
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         From the other viewpoint, the  symbolic affirmation of a distinctive political identity might 
instead come to operate  in inverse relation to the indistinctive character  of multi-level, interlocking 
authority.  It may become more important, either as a reaction against the compromised possibilities 
of self-government, or, at least, as a form of cultural compensation for the trend towards global 
interdependence.   
         That the contemporary  SNP  has consistently stressed the  instrumental worth over the 
cultural expression of political nationalism is underlined by its recent emphasis upon the  
continuing importance of the  bonds of Britishness, and its affirmation of a residual Union - both 
social and monarchical.  Yet nothing is simple in the politics of identity. Any  conception of 
political nationalism, in truth,  needs both dimensions - instrumental and expressive  - to operate in 
close tandem. It does so if it wishes  to avoid becoming either  a claim to  authority that cannot be 
won, or even if won, cannot be fully exploited, because it lacks the mobilising power of strong 
collective identity; or, conversely,  an insular  culture of  frustrated common destiny. This has often  
been a difficult balance for nationalist movements and projects to find and sustain. In today's 
constitutional politics, the relationship between the two dimensions, given the divergent tendencies 
just described,  may become  more volatile, more difficult, less easy to predict or to cultivate. 
        An unsettled Scottish constitutional prospectus, in conclusion, is not only the product of the 
realignment of  local and global forces into a more complex and less predictable  pattern of political 
authority. It is also a matter of deep political culture. For in consequence of that realignment of 
authority, the  very meaning   of  nationality as a primary frame   of political   identity, and   the    
very significance  of the constitutional form of self-expression as the symbolic link between the 
two, no longer readily conform to earlier understandings.
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